Predicting the Winners in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama and Comptroller v. Wynne

The Supreme Court heard oral argument in two cases on Wednesday, which wrapped up the arguments for November. I’m predicting the winners of the Supreme Court cases based on the number of questions asked during oral argument.  For more about this method, see my post on last Term’s Aereo case.

Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama asks whether Alabama’s legislative redistricting plans unconstitutionally classify black voters by race by intentionally packing them in districts designed to maintain supermajority percentages produced when 2010 census data are applied to the 2001 majority-black districts.

This case is difficult to predict because of the participation of the Solicitor General supporting neither party.  By my count, the Court asked the Appellants 51 questions, a fairly high number and 14 more than the Appellee, who was asked 37 questions.  The number of questions to the Appellants might be inflated by the fact that 2 attorneys argued (separately) for that side (some Justices seemed to pepper both attorneys with questions). The Court asked the Solicitor General 16 questions during 10 minutes.  Without the SG, the question count points to a victory for the Appellee (Alabama), given the large disparity of questions asked (14 more to the Appellant).

So the question is: will the Court favor the SG’s view (finding error in the district court’s decision upholding Alabama’s redistricting) or Alabama’s view (arguing for affirmance of the district court’s decision)?

The question count does not tell us much to answer this question, given the SG’s 10 minutes versus Alabama’s 30 minutes of questioning.  What is apparent is that the decision is likely to break down along conservative and liberal lines.

Three conservative Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Alito) asked the Appellee (Alabama) fewer questions (8, 9, and 1 fewer, respectively), and three liberal Justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan) asked the Appellants (Alabama Legislative Black Caucus) fewer questions (2, 2, and 9 fewer, respectively).  Interestingly, Justice Sotomayor, unlike the three aforementioned liberal Justices, asked far more questions (10) to the Appellant, but none to the SG or Appellee.  Meanwhile, Justice Kennedy, unlike the three aforementioned conservative Justices, asked one more question to the Appellee.

I don’t have much confidence predicting the decision based on these numbers.   But, if I had to choose, my guess would be 5-4 decision for affirmance.  I am swayed by the large disparity in the number of questions asked to the two sides, a number that suggests a win for the Appellee (Alabama), which was asked far fewer questions.

Figure 1.

Lee - 11.12.14 Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v Alabama

The second case, Comptroller of the Maryland Treasury v. Wynne, asks whether the United States Constitution prohibits a state from taxing all the income of its residents—wherever earned–by mandating a credit for taxes paid on income earned in other states.

This case is a close call.  The Court asked the Petitioner (Maryland Comptroller) 22 questions, the Solicitor General supporting Petitioner 15 questions, and the Respondent (Wynne) 39 questions.  Thus, by side, the Court asked close to the same number of questions: 37 questions to the Petitioner’s side and 39 questions to the Respondent’s side.

The Justices again appear to be divided along conservative-liberal lines.  Three conservative Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Alito) asked the Respondent fewer questions than the Petitioner (3, 5, and 1 fewer, respectively).  Four liberal Justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan) asked the Petitioner fewer questions (10, 5, 3, and 8 fewer, respectively).   Justice Kennedy appears to be the swing vote.  But he asked three questions to both the Petitioner and the Respondent, plus three to the SG.  What also must be taken into account is that prior studies have found the pattern of question count less accurate for Justice Kennedy.

Based on the question count, I see another 5-4 decision.  But which way?   Whichever way Justice Kennedy goes.  If I had to make a guess, I would pick a win for the Respondent (Wynne) based on the surmise that Justice Kennedy ends up going with the other conservative Justices, who seem to be favoring the Respondent’s argument.

Figure 2.

Lee - 11.12.14 Comptroller of Maryland Treasury v Wynne

A Modest Proposal

Supreme Court justices love to talk about the importance of public engagement. The American people, they insist, need to understand what the Court does and why. They write books and articles, deliver lectures, and give interviews, often with the express intention of informing the public about the Court’s work. Yet when it comes to actually reforming the way the Court operates to better serve these goals, the members of the Supreme Court sing a different tune. They hold tight to traditional practices, such as their process of releasing opinions, that make press coverage of the Court a uniquely challenging task. Not only do the justices refuse to allow cameras in the courtroom, but they delay release of audio of oral arguments until the end of each week and audio of opinion announcements until the beginning of the following Term.

While I think all of these practices should be reconsidered, for most of them I can see that there are some arguments on the side of tradition. (For a terrific discussion of these issues, see the video of this year’s Constitution Day event at Chicago-Kent.) But that last one—the delay of releasing audio of opinion announcements for several months—is pretty much indefensible. What possible purpose does this policy serve? In justifying their refusal to allow any live broadcast (video or audio) of oral arguments, the justices often talk about their fear of the media reducing complex points to misleading sound bites or of grandstanding by lawyers and justices. The sound-bite concern is minimal in the context of opinion announcements, though. The justices are summarizing their written opinions, so they have already taken the sound-biting into their own hands. Any possible risk of selective quotation would seem to be the same, or even less, than the risk of improperly quoting an excerpt from their written opinion. As for judicial grandstanding, I just have trouble seeing this as a problem. If anything, as I have noted in previous ISCOTUS posts, the justices tend to tone down some of the more accusatory language from their written opinions when reading a dissent from the bench. Anyway, a bit of grandstanding would not be a bad thing if one of the goals of an opinion announcement is to convey the importance of the issues at stake.

Furthermore, as I have explored in a law review article and previous posts, the justices (or perhaps their clerks) seem to put a good deal of time and thought into distilling their complex, often technical written opinions into a more accessible, compelling product for general consumption. At their best, opinion summaries—and particularly oral dissents—are the product of a thoughtful abridging of the written opinion. Justices sometimes reorder key points. They amplify certain arguments while muting others. They often highlight more tangible or evocative examples. Sometimes they land upon a nice turn of phrase that was not in the written opinion. (One of the most memorable lines in Justice Breyer’s oral dissent in Parents Involved—“It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much”—appears nowhere in his written dissent.) One would think the justices would want this live, condensed version of their opinion to be widely available. As it is now, the justices perform for a relatively miniscule audience in the courtroom. The best they can hope for is that a particularly notable performance might merit a mention in subsequent press accounts. This all makes little sense.

So here is my quite modest proposal: The Supreme Court should allow live broadcast of opinion announcements—preferably video, but audio would do. Or, if not live broadcast, then at least immediate release of video (or audio) recordings.

Bench announcements should be more important than they currently are. The voices of the justices, describing the reasoning behind their opinions in their own words, using language designed to appeal to the broader public, should be a part of the public debate that follows the release of a Court decision. They should be immediately available for teaching purposes as well. I have found bench announcements terrific teaching tools, particularly when working with audiences of non-lawyers. Not only do the justices do much of the work of condensing complex issues and highlighting key points, there is also something particularly engaging for students about hearing the opinions read in the justices’ own words. Why should students and engaged citizens need to wait until the following Term to listen to these bench announcements?

If the Supreme Court justices have any interest at all in bringing the Court’s public communications into the new century, and they certainly should, live video broadcast of opinion announcements would be a low-risk, high-benefit first step.

Predicting the Winners in T-Mobile v. Roswell and M&G Polymers v. Tackett

The Supreme Court heard oral argument in two cases on Monday. I’m predicting the winners of the Supreme Court cases based on the number of questions asked during oral argument.  I do not evaluate the actual substance of the questions except to determine if there was a question to elicit an answer or response from the advocates. For more about this method, see my post on last Term’s Aereo case.

T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell asks whether a document from a state or local government stating that an application has been denied, but providing no reasons whatsoever for the denial, can satisfy the Communications Act’s “in writing” requirement.

This case is difficult to call. By my count, the Court asked the Petitioner (T-Mobile South) 38 questions and the Respondent (City of Roswell) 41 questions.  The Solicitor General supporting neither party was asked 22 questions (10 by Justice Scalia), a fairly high number for the short time allotted to the SG as amicus curiae.

Figure 1.

Lee - 11.10.14 T-Mobile v Roswell

It’s not clear to me from the Court’s order how much time was allotted to the SG, but I’m guessing it was 10 minutes taken out of the Petitioner’s time because the SG at least agreed with the Petitioner that the City of Roswell’s explanation for its decision in the case was inadequate.  If my guess is correct, then the Petitioner receiving fewer questions might be a natural consequence of having fewer minutes allotted for oral argument.

Nonetheless, I’m giving a slight edge to the Petitioner (T-Mobile South).  Without discounting for what may have been more time for oral argument to the Respondent, the Petitioner received fewer questions from four Justices (Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Sotamayor). By contrast, three Justices  (Roberts, Ginsburg, and Kagan) asked the Respondent fewer questions.  Justice Breyer asked the same number of questions, and Justice Thomas asked no questions.  Besides the fewer total questions asked of the Petitioner and the greater number of Justices who asked the Petitioner fewer questions, I also found significant Justice Kennedy’s 7 questions to the Respondent (which is a high number for Kennedy, who asked 5 to the other side), as well as Justice Scalia’s 14 questions to the Respondent (11 more than he asked the Petitioner).  Justice Sotomayor also asked the Respondent a large differential of questions (6 more than the Petitioner).  Adding these factors up, I predict a victory for T-Mobile.

The second case, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, asks whether, when construing collective bargaining agreements in Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) cases, courts should presume that silence concerning the duration of retiree health-care benefits means the parties intended those benefits to vest (and therefore continue indefinitely), as the Sixth Circuit holds; or should require a clear statement that health-care benefits are intended to survive the termination of the collective bargaining agreement, as the Third Circuit holds; or should require at least some language in the agreement that can reasonably support an interpretation that health-care benefits should continue indefinitely, as the Second and Seventh Circuits hold.

This case is easier to predict–finally an easy one!  The Court asked the Petitioner (M&G Polymers) 47 questions and the Respondent (Tackett) 27 questions–a disparity of 20 questions.  I predict a victory for the Respondent.

Figure 2.

Lee - 11.10.14 - MG Polymers v Tackett

Weekly Roundup – November 7, 2014

Did you miss your Supreme Court news this week? Let our Weekly Roundup help. (To stay on top of the latest Supreme Court happenings, follow ISCOTUS on Twitter.)

ISCOTUS director Chris Schmidt explores the challenges of measuring the Court’s historical performance.

Ideological splits in the Court were evident when the justices considered what Justice Kagan called the “tinderbox” of Jerusalem in Monday’s passport case, Zivotofsky v. Kerry.

The Court smells something “fishy” in the fraud charges brought in Yates v. United States.

What does a Republican Senate mean for the Supreme Court? According to Jeffrey Rosen in the New Republic, it means disaster if we have an opening on the Court.

The Court tacitly acknowledges the Senate’s ability to set its own procedures by rejecting a challenge to the Senate’s filibuster rule (behind paywall).

Will the recent circuit split in same-sex marriage finally lead to a ruling by SCOTUS? At SCOTUSblog, Lyle Denniston analyzes the available paths for bringing the issue of same-sex marriage back before the Court.

Ed Lee predicts the winners in this week’s cases by looking at the number of questions asked during oral argument.

A Look Back—Justice Breyer’s Oral Dissent in McCutcheon

In previous posts, I discussed last Term’s oral dissents by Justices Sotomayor (Schuette) and Ginsburg (Hobby Lobby)—all now available on Oyez. I now turn to the other major oral dissent of the Term: Justice Breyer’s in the campaign finance case, McCutcheon v. FEC.

Justice Breyer’s oral dissents are particularly interesting listening, because they put on display a side of the justice we don’t often see. For anyone who has struggled to follow his meandering, professorial hypotheticals during oral argument, or anyone who has nodded off while listening to one of his public lectures, it is refreshing to hear the more direct and passionate Justice Breyer who comes through in his oral dissents. We saw this in his widely noted oral dissent in Parents Involved, the 2007 decision striking down the use of race in public school pupil assignment, and we saw this again last term in his McCutcheon bench dissent. In his ability to connect with an audience, he still falls well behind some of his colleagues—Scalia, Kagan, and Sotomayor, most especially—yet he comes quite a bit closer in these oral dissents.

Breyer’s oral dissent in McCutcheon diverges from his written dissent in two minor but interesting ways. First, he adopts a more colloquial, evocative tone and language to express his frustration with the majority’s reasoning in striking down aggregate limits on campaign contributions. Some of his modifications and additions seem designed to better engage a wider public. He adds a nice line about how the majority has replaced a set limit on aggregate campaign contributions with “a new number: infinity.” And he also adds the following catchy line: “If the Court in Citizens United opened the door, today’s decision, we fear, will open the floodgates.”

Second, in his oral dissent Breyer tones down (just a touch) his attack on the majority. He adds small qualifiers to some of his most accusatory lines. The following line—“Taken together with Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310 (2010), today’s decision eviscerates our Nation’s campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that those laws were intended to resolve”—becomes this—“Taken together with Citizens United, today’s holding, we fear, eviscerates our Nation’s campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that those laws were intended to resolve.” Also, at one point he throws in a compliment to Chief Justice Roberts, the author of the opinion of the Court, noting that his opinion is a “good opinion—although I don’t agree with it.” We’ve seen this kind of thing before. It’s not easy to launch an attack on an opinion when the author of that opinion is sitting only feet away. This can cause the oral dissenter to pull some punches (as Sotomayor did in her Schuette oral dissent) or, in this case, to go out of the way to emphasize that the critique is not a personal one.

 

 

Predicting the Winners in Yates v. US and Johnson v. US

The Supreme Court heard oral argument in two cases on Wednesday. I’m predicting the winners of the Supreme Court cases based on the number of questions asked during oral argument. Studies have shown that the advocate who receives more questions during oral argument is more likely to lose. For more about this method, see my post on last Term’s Aereo case.

Wednesday’s oral arguments were apparently filled with much laughter, as noted by the transcript. Perhaps the Court was in a good mood on the third day of arguments this week.

Yates v. United States asks whether Mr. Yates was deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519—which makes it a crime for anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object” with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation—where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying “tangible object” in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose.

This is a close call. The Court was very active in questioning both sides. By my count, the Petitioner (Yates) received 49 questions and the Respondent (Solicitor General) 54 questions, which militates slightly in favor of the Petitioner.

But, if you break down the questions asked by Justice, the picture gets more complicated. Four Justices (Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) asked the Respondent fewer questions, while only three Justices (Roberts, Scalia, and Breyer) asked the Petitioner fewer questions. Justice Alito asked both sides an equal number of questions (3). Justice Thomas asked no questions.

My confidence level is not high in predicting the winner. It appears to be a very close case. The total number of questions slightly favors the Petitioner, while the questions per Justice slightly favors the Respondent. If I had to choose, I would give a slight nod to the Respondent (Solicitor General) based on the higher number of Justices (4) who asked the Respondent fewer questions.

Figure 1.

Lee - 11.5.14 Yates v US

The second case, Johnson v. United States, asks whether mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun should be treated as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

This case is easier to predict, even though the total question count per side was closer. The Court asked almost the same number of questions to each side: 36 to the Petitioner (Johnson) and 37 to the Respondent (Solicitor General). The questions asked by each Justice tells a different picture. Four Justices (Roberts, Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan) asked the Petitioner fewer questions. Only two Justices (Scalia and Alito) asked the Respondent fewer questions. Justice Sotomayor asked the same number of questions (5) to each side, while Justices Kennedy and Thomas asked no questions. Another noteworthy point: Justice Alito, in fact, asked 17 questions to the Petitioner—a high number of questions that is somewhat unusual for a Justice to ask one side during oral argument. Justice Alito’s questioning might have inflated the Petitioner’s total question count, in other words. Accordingly, I predict a win for the Petitioner (Johnson), who argued that mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun is not a violent felony under the ACCA.

Figure 2.

Lee - 11.5.14 Johnson v US

 

Predicting the Winners in DHS v. MacLean and Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans

The Supreme Court heard oral argument in two cases on Tuesday. I’m predicting the winners of the Supreme Court cases based on the number of questions asked during oral argument. Studies have shown that the advocate who receives more questions during oral argument is more likely to lose. For more about this method, see my post on last Term’s Aereo case.

Dep’t of Homeland Security v. MacLean asks whether certain statutory protections codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), which are inapplicable when an employee makes a disclosure “specifically prohibited by law,” can bar an agency from taking an enforcement action against an employee who intentionally discloses Sensitive Security Information (SSI).

This is a very close call. The Court was very active in questioning both sides. By my count, each side received an equal number of questions (50), which is a relatively high number of questions for oral argument. If you break down the questions asked by Justice, 4 Justices (Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan) asked the Petitioner fewer questions, although the differential was not great for Justices Scalia and Alito, who asked the Petitioner only 2 fewer questions. Two Justices (Roberts and Ginsburg) asked the Respondent fewer questions (6 and 5 fewer questions, respectively). Justices Breyer and Sotomayor asked both sides an equal number of questions (10 and 9, respectively). Justice Thomas asked no questions.

My confidence level is not high in predicting the winner. It appears to be a very close case. Justices Breyer and Sotomayor asking both sides an equal number of questions makes this case even harder to predict. Nonetheless, if I had to choose, I would give a slight nod to the Petitioner (Solicitor General) based on the higher number of Justices (4) who asked the Petitioner fewer questions.

Figure 1.

Lee - 11.4.14 Dept of Homeland Security v maclean

The second case, Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., asks whether a borrower exercises his right to rescind a transaction in satisfaction of the requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635, by “notifying the creditor” in writing within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held; or whether the borrower must instead file a lawsuit within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held.

This case is easier to predict. The Court asked the Petitioner (Jesinoski) 18 questions, the Solicitor General supporting the Petitioner 8 questions, and the Respondent (Countrywide Homes Loans) 36 questions. The total question count suggests a win for the Petitioner, who argued that a borrower exercises his right to rescind a transaction in satisfaction of the requirements of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635, by “notifying the creditor” in writing within three years of the consummation of the transaction.

If you break down the questions asked by Justice, the tally also favors the Petitioner. Five Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) asked the Petitioner’s side (including the SG) fewer questions, although Roberts, Ginsburg, and Kagan asked just one fewer question. Also significant is the fact that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer asked no questions at all—somewhat a rarity—to Petitioner or the SG supporting Petitioner. Only Justice Alito asked Respondent significantly fewer questions (0 questions to 7 to the Petitioner’s side). The SG’s support is another plus factor for the Petitioner’s position. In short, I predict a victory for the Petitioner.

Figure 2.

Lee - 11.4.14 Jesinoski v Countrywide

 

Predicting the Winners in Zivotofsky v. Kerry and Omnicare v. Laborers District Council

The Supreme Court heard oral argument in two cases on Monday. I’m predicting the winners of the Supreme Court cases based on the number of questions asked during oral argument. Studies have shown that the advocate who receives more questions during oral argument is more likely to lose. For more about this method, see my post on last Term’s Aereo case.

Zivotofsky v. Kerry asks whether a federal statute that directs the Secretary of State, on request, to record the birthplace of an American citizen born in Jerusalem as born in “Israel” on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and on a United States passport is unconstitutional, on the ground that the statute “impermissibly infringes on the President’s exercise of the recognition power reposing exclusively in him.”

This is a very close call. Petitioner (Zivotofsky) received 51 questions, while the Respondent (Solicitor General) received 46 questions. If you break down the questions asked by Justice, 3 Justices (Roberts, Scalia, and Alito) asked the Petitioner fewer questions, and 4 Justices (Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) asked the Solicitor General fewer questions. Justice Ginsburg asked both sides an equal number of questions. Justice Thomas asked no questions. Given the conservative and liberal alignment of Justices in the question count, the key in this case appears to be Justice Kennedy. My confidence level is not high in predicting Kennedy’s vote based on the question count. He asked only one question more of the Petitioner, and his prior questioning in other cases does not correspond as well to the predicted pattern of outcomes based on question counts. Nonetheless, if I had to choose, my predicted winner is the Respondent (Solicitor General).

Figure 1.

Lee - 11.3.14 zivotofsky v kerry

The second case, Omnicare v. Laborers District Council, asks whether, for purposes of a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, a plaintiff may plead that a statement of opinion was “untrue” merely by alleging that the opinion itself was objectively wrong, as the Sixth Circuit has concluded, or whether the plaintiff must also allege that the statement was subjectively false—requiring allegations that the speaker’s actual opinion was different from the one expressed—as the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have held.

This case is also very hard to predict. The Court asked the Petitioner (Omnicare) 31 questions, Respondent (Laborers District Council) 21 questions, and the Solicitor General supporting Respondent 12 questions. Thus, the questions per side were fairly balanced (31 to 33 questions). If you break down the questions asked by Justice, the tally does not reveal much. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan asked the Petitioner’s side (including the SG) more questions (4, 5, and 4 more questions, respectively). Justices Alito and Sotomayor asked the Respondent’s side more questions (10 and 5 more questions, respectively). Chief Justice Roberts asked the Respondent’s side two more questions, whereas Justice Scalia asked the Petitioner two more questions. Justice Kennedy asked one question each to the Petitioner and to the SG. The SG’s support is a plus factor for the Respondent’s position, but I find the case too close to call based on just the question count.

Figure 2.

Lee - 11.3.14 omnicare v laborers

Measuring the Supreme Court

How does one measure the overall performance of the Supreme Court? This problem is at the heart of Erwin Chemerinsky’s new book, The Case Against the Supreme Court. Chemerinsky’s basic argument is that, when measured over the course of American history, the Supreme Court has done more harm than good. When faced with “its most important tasks, at its most important moments,” the Court has, more often than not, failed to serve the American people. This is a provocative claim, and it deserves serious consideration. Whether one accepts the claim, however, will likely depend on whether one accepts a series of assumptions on which it is based. They include: that it is even possible to measure Court rulings in this sort of net-benefit-to-society way; that Chemerinsky chooses the correct metrics in determining whether a particular Court ruling belongs in the failure or success column; and that Chemerinsky’s overall tally of Court failures and successes supports his larger claim that the Court has been, on balance, a failure.

These are big questions, each deserving lengthy exploration. I will only be able to touch on them briefly in this post. First, how does one even begin to measure whether a given Court opinion was a good thing or not? It is hard enough to establish any sort of objective measure of the written opinion itself. (More on this in a moment.) But add to this the difficulty of assessing the way Court rulings operate in society and the problem becomes frightfully complicated. Bad rulings can have the effect of mobilizing opposition movements that have benefits for society. (E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, which helped mobilize gay rights activists.) Good rulings can incite backlash movements that have costs for society. (Brown is the obvious example here.) And then there are the unexpected consequences of practically all major Court rulings—the good, the bad, and the mixed. (Read the late William Stuntz’s brilliant writing on the effects of the Warren Court’s criminal justice revolution and you’ll get a sense of the dilemma here.) All of this is to say that measuring something as complicated as a Supreme Court ruling is an astoundingly difficult task, one that demands not only an assessment of the written opinion but also of the complex, often unanticipated effects of a given Court ruling in society.

What about the particular metrics Chemerinsky uses to assess major Supreme Court rulings? Two points are worth noting here. One is that Chemerinsky focuses his analysis mostly on written opinions. He generally assumes that social effects can be extrapolated from the opinions themselves. The book does not give much space to the complexities unearthed by generations of judicial impact scholarship. This is, I believe, a significant shortcoming of the book. But it is also an understandable choice in a book written by a scholar whose expertise lies predominantly in the area of constitutional doctrine, not socio-legal scholarship, and whose primary goal is to provoke debate. (The basic conclusion found in most judicial impact scholarship is that the effects of bad cases are never quite as bad as feared, while the effects of good cases are never quite as good as hoped. Thus, this scholarship would largely work to undermine or at least weaken the simplicity and boldness of Chemerinsky’s case against the Court.)

The other complication—one that Chemerinsky recognizes but does not resolve—is the difficulty, and perhaps the impossibility, of locating criteria by which to measure whether a Court decision was a success or failure that does not just reduce to the ideological commitments of the author. Chemerinsky tries to negotiate this problem by emphasizing those decisions that have been universally praised or condemned. These are the decisions that reside in either the canon or “anticanon” of Supreme Court jurisprudence: Brown, West Virginia v. Barnette, Gideon v. Wainwright, Reynolds v. Sims, on the one side; Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, Buck v. Bell, Korematsu, on the other. But even if these categorizations are accepted (certainly not all would agree on this point), Chemerinsky does not confine his analysis to these canonical and anticanonical cases. After all, these cases constitute only a small minority of the Court’s decisions. To make his case against the Court, he compiles a list of successes and failures that includes much more controversial categorizations, placing rulings whose merits are still quite contested—such as recent Court decisions involving affirmative action or the scope of congressional power—into either the failure or success columns. And despite his protestations to the contrary, Chemerinsky’s assessments follow predictable lines: decisions favored by liberals are successes, those favored by conservatives, failures.

Finally, once one settles on a way to define success and failure for the Court, how does one compare them? Does Dred Scott plus Brown equal success, failure, or a wash? Bad decisions that upheld bad policy (such as Plessy or Korematsu) do not provide the same evidence in the case against the Court as bad decisions that overturned good policy (e.g., Dred Scott, Lochner). Similarly, good decisions that upheld good policy (e.g., West Coast Hotel, Heart of Atlanta) do not add the same value for Chemerinsky’s purposes as good decisions that strike down bad policy (e.g., Barnette, Brown, Gideon).

All of this is to say that Chemerinsky’s book is a great conversation starter. In the end, I found the questions underlying the eye-catching thesis more interesting than the thesis itself. Regardless of whether one agrees with Chemerinsky that the Court has failed more often than it has succeeded, it is fascinating just to think through the challenges of assessing the Court’s performance over its more than two centuries of history.

Weekly Roundup – October 31, 2014

Did you miss your Supreme Court news this week? Let our Weekly Roundup help. (To stay on top of the latest Supreme Court happenings, follow ISCOTUS on Twitter.)

The three Yale-graduate justices visited their alma mater for an awards ceremony, where Justice Alito revealed his deadpan sense of humor.

Why has the Court seemingly gone silent even as it takes action on critical issues such as gay marriage, voting rights, and abortion? Adam Liptak reviews in the New York Times, and ISCOTUS director Chris Schmidt offers his own thoughts here.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg approves of John Oliver’s viral video sketch portraying the Supreme Court as nine talking dogs.

Why are we so fascinated with the justices’ cultural tastes? Time magazine examines the latest in a series of “cultural-diet revelations” from the judges.

The Court takes on its first case involving a federal whistleblower.

Does a child’s wish to list “Israel” as the nation of birth on his American passport disrupt the Obama administration’s efforts to establish piece in the region? The Court hears oral arguments in the case next week.

Chris Schmidt considers Erwin Chemerinsky’s new book and America’s love-hate relationship with the Supreme Court.

Will the Court take another look at Obamacare?