The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements by Professor Cho

Professor Sungjoon Cho and his co-author Keith Hylton (Boston University) have recently posted their new working paper "The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements" on ssrn.  Here is the abstract:

 This paper extends the economic literature on settlement, and draws some practical insights on reverse settlements. The key contributions to the economic literature on settlements follow from the distinction drawn between standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, which prohibit the defendant’s activity. The analysis identifies the conditions under which injunctive settlements (rather than standard settlements) are likely to be observed and the conditions under which reverse settlements will be observed among the injunctive settlements. Specifically, reverse settlements are likely when the stakes associated with the injunction are large relative to damages and litigation costs. The analysis of settlement here has broader implications for efficient remedies and legal rules.