Weekly Roundup, October 30, 2015

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ISCOTUS Director Christopher Schmidt discusses Melvin Urofsky’s new book, Dissent and the Supreme Court.

Justices in the news: Justice Sotomayor visited Pomona College in California and offer a very personal perspective on life at the Court; Justice Kennedy was at Harvard Law School, where he lamented the current state of  the American criminal justice system.

At Knowledge Center, Lisa Soronen examined the impact upcoming SCOTUS cases could have on specific states.

The book Notorious RBG, based on the Tumblr featuring Justice Ginsburg, got some coverage in NPR’s All Things Considered. At ThinkProgress, Ian Millhiser reviewed the book, writing, “Notorious RBG does more than chronicle one woman’s life, it chronicles a time when Americans slayed dragons.”

In anticipation of next week’s oral arguments in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, Justin Sadowsky of Dubitante wrote about “why a pro-Spokeo ruling here . . . would be revolutionary in its breadth.” On Hamilton and Griffin on Rights, commentator Erwin Chemerinsky implored the Court to “reaffirm that Congress, by statute, can create rights, albeit rights that otherwise would not exist, and the infringement of these rights is a sufficient injury for standing.”

Looking ahead to next week’s oral arguments in Torres v. Lynch, Steve Vladeck wrote about how the Court’s response “could significantly either expand or contract the class of state-law convictions that render non-citizens subject to removal going forward.” In the ABA Journal, Mark Walsh also previewed the case.

On USAToday, Richard Wolf outlined the coming shift in the Supreme Court with the new presidential term and the Court’s ageing lineup.

What Makes a Great Supreme Court Dissent?

 

What is the significance of a dissent at the Supreme Court?  According to legal historian Melvin I. Urofsky, in most cases dissents don’t matter much at all.  “Nearly all of them are forgotten today, because they had no lasting jurisprudential value, they did not convince future courts … they did not contribute to the constitutional dialogue,” a term he uses to refer to the contestation over constitutional issues that takes place outside the judiciary.  Yet some dissents have not been forgotten.  Some dissents have played a role in shaping future events.  Some dissents have resonated with “the intelligence of a future day,” as Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes memorably put it.  These dissents are the subject of Urofsky’s just published book, Dissent and the Supreme Court: Its Role in the Court’s History and the Nation’s Constitutional Dialogue.

Urofsky traces the fascinating history of dissenting practices on the Supreme Court.  In the early nineteenth century, Chief Justice John Marshall persuaded his colleagues to abandon the practice of having each justice write his own opinion in every case in favor of having a single opinion speak for the entire Court.  Dissents were rare on the Marshall Court.  Under the leadership of Marshall’s successor, Roger B. Taney, who served as Chief Justice from 1836-1864, dissents gradually increased in frequency.  Although most cases were still decided with a single opinion of the Court, from the Taney Court into the early twentieth century, dissenting opinions became common practice in major constitutional cases.  Whatever hesitancy justices had toward dissenting dissolved in the 1940s. The rate of unanimous decisions plummeted and dissents (as well as concurring opinions) became commonplace.  

Some have expressed concern that the modern practice of multiple opinions, often fractured in dizzying ways, risks undermining the Supreme Court’s legitimacy.  Have court opinions “become a babble making it difficult, if not impossible, for the constitutional dialogue to take place?” Urofsky wonders.  In defense of themselves, the justices typically offer two responses.  First, they emphasize that they actually agree on a large percentage of cases.  And second, they argue that dissents ultimately strengthen the Court.  “When history demonstrates that one of the Court’s decisions has been a truly horrendous mistake,” Justice Scalia explains, “it is comforting—and conducive of respect for the Court—to look back and realize that at least some of the Justices saw the danger clearly, and gave voice, often eloquent voice, to their concern.”

Urofsky offers a thorough and often quite fascinating description of famous Supreme Court dissents through the years.  He draws on his deep knowledge of American legal history to provide useful context about surrounding events and the justices themselves, allowing the reader to fully understand the issues and personalities involved.  One can read the book from start to finish and receive an edifying overview of the history of the Court.  Or one can take a more selective approach, exploring the many anecdotes and character sketches that populate the book.

Why do some dissents resonate, while most are largely forgotten?  This is a question that Urofsky considers throughout the book. Urofsky suggests that the justices themselves have some control over the impact of their dissents.  He argues, for example, that the “babble” of many dissents and concurrences diminish the impact of any given opinion.  He notes that Justice Frankfurter’s frequent concurring and dissenting, combined with his lengthy, law-review style writing tendencies, has limited the impact of his opinions.  He also believes that Scalia’s uncompromising, attacking style gets attention but limits the persuasive value of his dissents.  

But, in the end, Urofsky admits, “we cannot tell at the time whether or not a dissent will succeed in its call to future generations.”  There are plenty of eloquent, quotable dissents gathering dust in the U.S. Reports.  What really explains why some dissents last, and some do not, comes down to the national “constitutional dialogue” referenced in the book’s subtitle.  

The national constitutional dialogue is always bigger than any Supreme Court opinion.  When it comes to major issues of constitutional contestation, Supreme Court opinions join the dialogue.  Landmark Court rulings can elevate the salience of a constitutional dispute.  This was the case with Brown, for example, or Roe.  Court rulings can steer discussion in certain ways.  But for a dissent—a legal statement that requires no one to do anything—to play a role in this constitutional dialogue requires not only a measure of eloquence and some quotable lines.  It requires people outside the Court who are engaged in this constitutional dialogue to use these dissents to advance their agenda.  And it requires some receptivity among the American people to the vision of law contained in the dissent.  Historical circumstances, not justices, make great dissents.

Weekly Roundup, October 23, 2015

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ISCOTUS Director Christopher Schmidt looked back to the dramatic bench announcements at the Supreme Court in last term’s death penalty case, Glossip v. Gross.

On Casetext, Colin Starger considers this week’s arguments in Montgomery v. Louisiana, involving the retrospective application of a previous holding in which the Court prohibited mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles.  He concludes: “With the problem of mass incarceration now getting mainstream attention, the Court may realize that retroactive application of important new rules is one easy way to get very old men and women out of prison.”

Further commentary pours in after last week’s oral arguments for Hurst v. Florida as the Court considers the constitutionality of Florida’s scheme for sentencing the death penalty. Sam Kamin wrote “the Florida capital scheme is spectacularly, flamboyantly unconstitutional and . . . Florida seems not much to care.” In the National Review, Jonathan Keim predicted, “On the whole, I think the Court will split the baby on this case.”

Tony Mauro wrote about how Supreme Court Justices check for conflicts without software. “‘The conflict-checking process is an internal one carried out by the individual chambers,’” wrote Court spokeswoman Kathy Arberg.

Coverage continues on the class-action case Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, the case of a litigant who “won’t take yes for an answer.” ABA Journal summarizes the issues.

On Bloomberg BNA, Kimberly Robinson explained why preemption cases “are fascinating . . . really!”

During a University of Minnesota Law School appearance, Justice Scalia commented on the Court’s approach to the death penalty, as well as his experience on the bench. “I have never aspired to have the most dissents in the court’s history . . . I’m in third place now. I hope I’m never in first place.”

Listen to This—Justice Scalia’s Remarkable Bench Announcement in Glossip

Last term at the Supreme Court ended with a bit of drama from the bench that provided a fitting end to a term marked by more than its fair share of raw emotions in the courtroom.  

The last major decision announcement was Glossip v. Gross, a challenge to Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol.  Glossip, a prisoner on death row, challenged the 3-drug protocol on the grounds that the first of the drugs, which was designed to anesthetize the prisoner, was of questionable efficacy.  Glossip lost.  A five-justice majority upheld the lower court’s ruling that found the lethal injection protocol did not constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.  

April’s oral arguments in Glossip produced a particularly heated discussion in the courtroom.  Justice Alito accused anti-death penalty advocates of engaging in a “guerilla war” by pressuring drug companies to get out of the business of supplying drugs used in executions.  Oral arguments also took several macabre turns, as the justices and the lawyers discussed various methods of execution: hanging, gas chambers, firing squads.  At one point the discussion even turned to the constitutionality of execution by being burned alive.  (All agreed that burning as a method of execution was unconstitutional, but Justice Alito was curious about whether the same could be said if the condemned were unconscious and felt no pain.)

An emotional oral argument with wild hypotheticals may not be the norm at the Court, but it is hardly unprecedented.  It was the bench announcements in Glossip—the audio of which was recently released by the Court—that broke new ground for the Roberts Court.  When an opinion is handed down, the author of the majority opinion takes a few minutes to summarize the opinion.  On occasion—usually just a few times a term—the author of a dissenting opinion will also speak from the bench.  But in Glossip, four different justices wanted to talk about their opinions from the bench: a majority opinion, two dissents, and a concurrence.

Justice Alito announced the opinion of the Court rejecting Glossip’s Eighth Amendment claim. Justice Sotomayor followed with a summary of her dissent.  Her bench statement, only her second oral dissent during her six years on the High Court, made clear her vehement disagreement with the majority’s reasoning.  Justice Breyer then announced his dissenting opinion.  Breyer signed onto Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, but he also wrote a bombshell of an opinion, joined only by Justice Ginsberg, in which he went beyond the issue of the constitutionality of this particular method of execution and raised the question of whether the entire death penalty was unconstitutional.  Such a momentous declaration from two Supreme Court justices, Breyer felt, merited the very rare step of having two dissenting opinions announced from the bench.  

But this was not the end of it.  Justice Scalia has long made clear that he has no patience for anyone who would argue that the death penalty violates the Constitution: the Constitution, he points out, includes several references to capital punishment.  He thus felt the need to join the closing-day performance and announce his own concurring opinion dedicated exclusively to refuting Justice Breyer dissent.  (Scalia’s opinion was more of a dissent from a dissent than a concurrence.)  

Scalia took advantage of his platform and offered a brief statement in which he not only denounced Justice Breyer’s challenge to the constitutionality of the death penalty, but also denounced the Court’s same-sex marriage decision that the justices handed down several days earlier.  He argued that the reasoning of both Justice Kennedy’s ruling striking down state bans on same-sex marriage and Justice Breyer’s argument against the death penalty suffer from the same flaw.  In each case, justices decided an issue that, according to Scalia, the Constitution properly left to the democratic process.  Justice Scalia concluded his statement with a line that Justice Breyer used in his bench dissent in the Parents Involved public school desegregation case of 2007: “It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much.”  

Listen to the bench announcement here.

Weekly Roundup, October 16, 2015

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On Tuesday, the Court discussed Montgomery v. Louisiana, a return to the earlier ruling in 2012’s Miller v. Alabama regarding life without parole for juveniles convicted of murder. The court is considering whether its ruling in 2012 applies to cases finalized when Miller was decided. For analysis, see Lyle Denniston on SCOTUSblog and Noah Feldman on BloombergView.  In the Stanford Law Review Online, Jason Zarrow and William Milliken discuss the  jurisdictional issue in the case.

In The Washington Post, Steven Mazie wrote that the Court “has often been a lightning rod of controversy in its 226 years, but never before have so many darts been lobbed at the institution from so many points on the political spectrum.”

At the New York Times, Linda Greenhouse wrote “the stakes couldn’t be higher” regarding challenges to Texas’s new abortion laws.

Five justices recused themselves on Tuesday in response to an angry petition from a disbarred IP lawyer, Patrick Missud. Without a quorum, the petition was dismissed.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor officiated a same-sex marriage on Saturday, which makes her the third Justice to have officiated a same-sex marriage.

Garrett Epps previewed Sturgeon v. Masica in The Atlantic, a case about “whether the federal government can keep John Sturgeon, a 75-year-old Alaska outdoorsman, from using his personal hovercraft to stalk the wily moose in the wilds of the Yukon-Charley Rivers National.”

The Term Ahead at the Supreme Court

One week into the new Term at the U.S. Supreme Court, the early conventional wisdom is taking shape, and it’s looking like a good term for the conservatives.  Last term ended on a high note for the liberals.  In addition to the same-sex marriage decision, there were a number of dodged bullets as the four justice liberal bloc were able to get the votes to secure majorities to fight back challenges to the Affordable Care Act and the Fair Housing Act.  The liberals were also in the majority in closely divided opinions on voter redistricting and the regulation of judicial elections.  But now, as the new term gets underway, commentators are predicting that the pendulum is about to swing.

What are the cases in which this conservative comeback will take place?  Here are three cases the Court will hear, plus one that the Court will likely hear, that many see as opportunities for significant conservative victories.  

(1) Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association.  Public-sector unions are back at the Court, and many are predicting the Court’s conservatives will continue down the path they’ve been charting in recent terms and further restrict mandatory fees required by non-union members.  In a line of precedent dating to the 1970s, the Court has held that non-union members may be required to pay a “fair share” fee to unions to cover expenses relating to collective bargaining (but excluding expenses relating to political activity).  In Friedrichs, a group of California teachers challenged the required payment of union fees of any kind.  They argued that collective bargaining is a form of political activity, and being forced to fund the union’s collective bargaining efforts is a violation of the First Amendment’s prohibition on compelled speech.  In recent cases, Court conservatives have been receptive to these kind of First Amendment challenges to mandatory fees.

(2) Fisher v. University of Texas.  Not only is affirmative action in higher education back at the Supreme Court, but Abigail Fisher is back.  In 2012 the Court first heard Fisher’s challenge to the racial preference program at the University of Texas.  The Court issued a decision that offered additional guidelines on when university racial preference programs were constitutionally permissible and remanded the case back to the appeals court.  The lower courts reviewed the case again, upheld UT’s racial preference program again, and Fisher’s lawyers have appealed their ruling yet again.  Texas has a unique hybrid approach to achieving racial diversity in its universities, combining a policy that assures admittance to the university system to those in the top 10% of their high school class with a race-conscious admissions policy.  The question before the Court is whether Texas can sufficiently justify the necessity of the race conscious policy when it achieves substantial diversity with its top 10% plan.

(3) Evenwel v. Abbott. The issue of voting rights returns to the Court in a case that raises the question of how to measure population for purposes of redistricting under the one person, one vote requirement.  Is the proper measure eligible voters or the total number of residents?  Practically all states use total residents, but the challengers in this case argue that only eligible voters should be counted.  In districts with large numbers of residents who are not eligible to vote (legal immigrants who are not citizens, undocumented immigrants, felons), a ruling adopting the challengers argument would be highly consequential, likely tilting political power from cities to rural areas—a change that would benefit Republicans.

(4) And it’s likely that abortion will be back.  The last time the Supreme Court heard a major abortion case was 2007, when it upheld the federal law banning so-called “partial-birth” abortions.  This term the Court is likely to consider a challenge to a 2013 Texas law that requires abortion clinics to meet the same standards for equipment and staffing as hospital-style surgical centers and requires for doctors who provide abortions to have admitting privileges at local hospitals.  These new regulations would result in the shutting down of most of the state’s abortion clinics.  The Fifth Circuit upheld the new regulations.  In June, in a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court voted to block the Fifth Circuit ruling until they had time to consider the issue—making it likely they will take up the case.

Weekly Roundup, October 9, 2015

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On Monday, the Justices opened a new term at the Supreme Court. In USA Today, Richard Wolf wrote that the new Term “truly is deja vu all over again.” Robert Barnes said that the new Term’s “docket . . . seems designed to remind Americans about the importance of the high court in the presidential contest” in the Washington Post.

On FiveThirtyEight, Oliver Roeder draws on empirical studies of ideological “drift” on the Supreme Court to argue that Justices tend to become more liberal as they get older.

At the New Yorker, Lincoln Caplan discusses last term’s death penalty decision as a possible turning point in a movement that could end with the Court abolishing the death penalty.

The first death penalty of the new term involved  a case “so shocking it has its own Wikipedia entry”: The Wichita Massacre. According to Robert Barnes, “the Supreme Court spent two hours Wednesday not very successfully trying to separate the brutality of the murder rampage carried out by brothers Reginald and Jonathan Carr in 2000 from the somewhat antiseptic legal issues that caused the Kansas Supreme Court to overturn their death sentences.”

In OBB Personenverkehr v. Sachs on Monday, the Court considered whether or not an Austrian national railroad is entitled to sovereign immunity from a lawsuit by a woman injured in a railroad accident in Austria. Noah Feldman suggested the Court is hearing the case “to try to keep control of how U.S. laws implicate foreign sovereigns.” On Lawfare, Ingrid Wuerth analyzed the proceedings and said the Justices “seemed strongly inclined to hold for OBB and reverse, but they proffered several potential reasons for doing so.”

Time Magazine polled experts about the best Supreme Court decisions since 1960.  Winners include Loving v. Virginia and New York Times v. Sullivan.

This week the Court released audio of opinion announcements from last term.  Go to Oyez and listen to the contentious announcements in the same-sex marriage case, the Affordable Care Act case, the death penalty case, and more.

Weekly Roundup, October 2, 2015

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Oyez has a new and improved look!  Allie Bernstein tells us all about it.

ISCOTUS Director Christopher Schmidt gets to the bottom of Justice Scalia’s widely noted comment about his “four colleagues” who were ready to strike down the death penalty.  (He was misquoted.)

Richard Hasen explains how “the future composition of the Supreme Court is the most important civil rights cause of our time.”

The New York Times laid out the events in the timeline of Oklahoma death row inmate Richard Glossip, whose execution is now scheduled on November 6. The Supreme Court, which last term rejected Glossip’s challenge to Oklahoma’s method of execution, has refused to intervene.

Orin Kerr imagines what a confirmation hearing in 2035 will look like.  (Hint: It’s all about tweets and Facebook friendship.)

The New York Times had an obituary for Doug Kendall, founder of the Constitutional Accountability Center and a vocal critic of the Supreme Court’s conservatives.  Randy Barnett praised Kendall as “a true gentleman who loved the Constitution.”

Oyez: New and Improved

This is a guest post from our friends at Oyez, a digital multimedia archive of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Just in time for the start of the October Term 2015, we here at Oyez are proud to unveil a brand new version of our website. Not only does it look much cleaner, it is easier to navigate, find, and discover the treasures of our content.

Some new features include:

  • An improved audio player. The player opens quickly (no more loading bar) and the features are improved as well. The bench of justices who heard the case are pictured at the top, and whenever a justice speaks, that justice’s image will light up on the player. The audio has also been directionalized, so it sounds like the justice is speaking from their place on the bench. The search functionality is cleaner, and we’ve made it easier to clip, download, and share from our player.
  • Cleaner visuals. The site is much more intuitive to navigate and easier to understand. In addition, each case page features a larger visual array of the justices’ vote breakdown and short explanations for every decision made in the case. (For an impressive example of this feature, check out the 12 decisions in McConnell v. FEC!)
  • The introduction of the Oyez email list. Want to be in the know when it comes to the workings of the Supreme Court or Oyez’s latest content? Simply subscribe, and you’ll get the inside scoop.
  • In addition to the email list, you can easily see new ways to find Oyez around the web. On the top left of every page of the site, you’ll find links not just to our Facebook and Twitter, you’ll find the podcast of each recent Term’s arguments as well as a link to help support Oyez’s work.
  • Responsive design. No matter where you look at Oyez, be it on your phone, tablet, or computer, Oyez’s screen will fit yours.

We have many more features that are currently in the works. Many of the justices already feature improved biographies, and the rest are on their way. Short case descriptions pop up for many of our most popular cases, and more are being written every day. And, as many users have requested, we’ll be bringing back the ability to search by topic.

The transition may cause some problems, so don’t hesitate to let us know if you come across any issues. We’re already working on building a bridge to reconnect the site with the ISCOTUSnow and Pocket Justice apps. We’ve also discovered that cases pre-1900 without a docket number are having trouble making the URL switch. If you’re linking to a specific case page that isn’t working, you can simply search for the case on the site instead.

Thank you to all of our audience who gave us feedback during the beta phase of the website, and to everyone who uses our content. Oyez wouldn’t exist without you!

Scalia, the Court, and the End of the Death Penalty

Justice Scalia made news last week for his remarks during an appearance at Rhodes College.  In addition to expressing in his characteristically blunt way his frustration with the Court’s same-sex marriage opinion from last term, he predicted that the Court was on its way to striking down the death penalty.  The prediction got a good deal of attention, with death penalty opponents hoping that Justice Scalia’s predictive powers proved as accurate in this case as they did when he predicted over a decade ago the demise of prohibitions on same-sex marriage.  

Scalia, according to widely noted tweets by Jennifer Pignolet of the Memphis Commercial Appeal, who was covering the Justice’s speech, also suggested that four of his colleagues were ready to strike down the death penalty.  This nugget of information sparked a flurry of speculation in the Court-watching community.  Who were these four justices?  Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting in last terms’ review of Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol, Glossip v. Gross, in which he argued at length for why he believed the death penalty may violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment.”  But only Justice Ginsburg signed on this opinion.  So where does Scalia get his four from?  Justices Sotomayor and Kagan dissented in Glossip, and they expressed concerns with the administration of the death penalty in Oklahoma and elsewhere, but they chose not to join Breyer’s bombshell opinion.  Might Scalia be assuming that Justice Kennedy could be leaning in this direction?  His jurisprudence, well on display in his same-sex marriage opinion, would seem to make him open to the kinds of arguments death penalty opponents offer, and he has written several major opinions on the death penalty and other Eighth Amendment issues.  Regardless of who exactly Scalia might be been talking about, why was he even talking about where other justices were on this issue if they had not chosen to lay out their position in a Court opinion?  Scalia’s comments appeared to a violate a basic tenet of Supreme Court judicial ethics: the justices are not supposed to talk about what happens behind the scenes at the Court.

In the end, this was a bunch of sound and fury over nothing.  Scalia did not say that four of his current colleagues are ready to strike down the death penalty.  What he said, as Pignolet of the Commercial Appeal reported in a follow-up article, was the following: “I sat with three colleagues who thought the death penalty is unconstitutional … I sat with three colleagues, and there is now a fourth — Justice Breyer has announced that he thinks the death penalty is unconstitutional.”  This quotation clearly indicates that Scalia was looking backwards in time, to colleagues he sat with, not to his colleagues on the current Court.  He was not talking about Sotomayor or Kagan or Kennedy.  He was talking about William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun, each of whom denounced the death penalty as unconstitutional while sitting on the Court.  In talking about his four anti-death penalty colleagues, Scalia was not saying anything we didn’t already know.

The moral of the story?  Tweets are a lousy way to get our coverage of public events.  This is particularly true when the source is someone who is not a regular reporter on the law or the Supreme Court.  And this misreported story would never have happened if Justice Scalia allowed recordings of his remarks.  One sure outcome of all this is that it will only reinforce the Justice’s already low opinion of press coverage of his work.