Gray v. Martino
103 A. 24 (1918)
Minturn, J.
The plaintiff occupied the position of a special police officer in Atlantic City, and incidentally was identified with the work of the prosecutor of the pleas of the county. He possessed knowledge concerning the theft of certain diamonds and jewelry from the possession of the defendant, who had advertised a reward for the recovery of the property. In this situation he claims to have entered into a verbal contract with defendant whereby she agreed to pay him $500 if he could procure for her the names and addresses of the thieves. As a result of his mediation with the police authorities the diamonds and jewelry were recovered, and plaintiff brought this suit to recover the promised reward. The district court, sitting without a jury, awarded plaintiff a judgment for the amount of the reward, and hence this appeal.
Various points are discussed in the briefs, but to us the dominant and conspicuous inquiry in the case is, Was the plaintiff during the period of this transaction a public officer, charged with the enforcement of the law?
Question
If the answer is “yes,” then the plaintiff (the special police officer) had a legal obligation to enforce the law, an obligation which would encompass efforts (when and where appropriate) to find the names and addresses of the jewelry thieves.
(a) True
Correct. The plaintiff would already be under a legal duty to find the names and addresses of thieves at the time he entered into the agreement with the defendant.
(b) False
Incorrect. The plaintiff would already be under a legal duty to find the names and addresses of thieves at the time he entered into the agreement with the defendant.
The testimony makes it manifest that he was a special police officer to some extent identified with the work of the prosecutor’s office, and that position upon well-settled grounds of public policy required him to assist at least, in the prosecution of offenders against the law.
The services he rendered in this instance must be presumed to have been rendered in pursuance of that public duty, and for its performance he was not entitled to receive a special quid pro quo.
The cases on the subject are collected in a footnote to Somerset Bank v. Edmund, 10 App. Cas. p. 726 (76 Ohio St. 396, 81 N. E. 641,11 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1170), the headnote to which reads:
‘Public policy and sound morals alike forbid that a public officer should demand or receive, for services performed by him in the discharge of official duty, and other or further remuneration or reward than that prescribed and allowed by law.’
. . .
The judgment below for that reason must be reversed.